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such that reformers are distinguished from others. 
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In Africa, public sector reform is a key element in development policies and one of the 
major efforts asked by donors (Cohen 1993; Sandbrook and Oelbaum 1997; Olowu 
1999). Reforming customs is critical to the success of transport and governmental trade 
facilitation policies supported by donors. More generally, it is a national issue for the 
political authority as African customs administrations collect between 20 per cent to 60 
per cent of national revenue. 
Before considering how an administration should or could be reformed, we must 
consider how it actually works. This paper takes a step in the direction of such an 
empirical approach, by developing a case study and making use of the anthropological 
technique of participant-observation.1  
I participated in the Cameroon customs reform, during four years (2006–10), as a 
technical expert in a project team composed of senior and junior customs officers and IT 
experts. All team members committed themselves fully to the project— the roll-out of a 
new and robust IT customs system and a reform of the customs procedures, which was 
an official commitment of the government to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
The project was relatively successful—the new IT system was launched in early 2007, 
supported new procedures and increased revenues collection performance (Cantens 
2007). The study has its roots in this experience and is based on two hypotheses. 
The first draws on Abélès et al. (1993) where they immersed themselves in the civil 
servants’ world of the European Commission. Even if they are part of a wider world 
than their professional community, Cameroon customs officials set up a ‘micro-society 
with its codes, its rituals and its customs’ (Abélès et al. 1993: 5).  
The second hypothesis is that studying the actual functioning of a public administration 
cannot be valuable without assuming that what is seen as dysfunctional by technical 
experts could perhaps not be dysfunctional, since revenue targets—assessed at the 
beginning of each year by the government supported by IMF experts—have been 
achieved by Cameroon customs for the past four years. 
On the one hand, for various reasons, and also because they are wealthy civil servants, 
African customs officials are perceived as a national elite involved in development and 
dragged into corruption. It is unfortunately a fact that corruption is part of the 
functioning of the customs state apparatus and, consequently, a key element for 
considering reform. The non-profit organization Transparency International has ranked 
                                                 
1  This article is extracted from a PhD in social anthropology defended in February 2010 at the Ecole des 
Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (director: Mr André Bourgeot) about an ethnography of   
Cameroon customs. It is an ‘ethnographic case study’, which means that it is based on the 
ethnographic technique of participant-observation and it is not comparative but focused on a single 
unit. ‘Case study’ and ‘participant observation’ slightly differ, even if ‘case study is inspired by 
participant observation’ (Hamel 1993: 491). ‘Case study’ is ‘a definitional morass’ and could also 
refer to ethnographic research (Gerring 2004: 342). ‘Participant observation’ is a technique based on 
living within the group of people who are involved in the social facts to be analysed. Ethnography has 
already been used to describe customs administrations (see Bako Arifari 2001; Blundo and Olivier de 
Sardan 2001; Chalfin 2006).  
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Cameroon as one of the most corrupt countries2 and Cameroon customs as one of the 
three most corrupt national administrations.  
On the other hand, any current customs reform is based on trade facilitation and risk 
management (World Bank 2004), which means fewer contacts with the importers and 
exporters and, therefore, fewer opportunities to be bribed. Corruption is far from being 
the concern only of scholars or donors; it occupies the minds of all customs officials. 
Cameroon customs officers themselves admit that corruption is a major obstacle to any 
reform (Libom et al. 2009).  
Considering that corruption could be a major impediment to reform, the main issue is 
how to take corruption into account from a technical point of view, without including 
the moral dimension of the word itself. Addressing the issue of reform in a context of 
widespread corruption can be endless. First, it is very difficult to gather facts that could 
be included in a case study (Blundo 2003). Second, officials on the field usually argue 
that low wages are the main cause of corruption but this argument is unlikely. Financial 
incentive schemes have existed in many customs administrations for years and they 
have failed to eradicate corruption.  
Media articles, perception, rumours and legitimizing discourses cannot be the only raw 
data in a scientific approach. Thus, this article focuses on money before addressing the 
challenges faced by reformist senior officers. Money is the only material element of 
corruption. Moreover focusing on money takes into account the specificity of fiscal 
administrations. Unlike other professions, customs officials collecting duties and taxes 
work with money, which is the raw material for corruption. Consequently, this paper 
views customs as a state apparatus that extracts and circulates money—whether legal or 
illegal. 
The first part of the paper will demonstrate that there is legal money circulating within 
the group, which is legitimized by corruption. This legal and internal money circulation 
is the core of customs officers’ power and the material root of senior management’s 
elitism. The second part will explore how this elitism infers the conditions of the social 
reproduction of the group and could be an impediment or an opportunity for 
administrative change.  
2  Money circulation and elites 
The most common function assigned to customs services is to collect duties and taxes 
on behalf of the treasury. In Cameroon, the share of taxes and duties collected by 
customs amounts to 27 per cent of the national budget. As this public money flows out 
of the group of customs officials, a second type of well-known currency flows in, but 
only for some officials. Bribes, like taxes and duties, circulate. They are nothing more 
than money extracted from the same goods as those on which duties and taxes are 
levied, but headed for a personal destination. And, like revenue collection, the 
extraction of this private money is grounded in the existence of the state apparatus: 
officials always invoke their statutory authority to block the release of goods or to 
                                                 
2  Ranked last in 1998 and 1999 and 141st out of 180 in 2008. Of course, Transparency International 
only issues a classification based on the ‘perception’ of corruption.  
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punish the fraud they have detected, whether they use this power in exchange of a bribe 
or not.3 
Bribes, however, are not the only way to get rich. Customs officials benefit from an 
efficient and legal system of individual remuneration; fines are assessed from 50 per 
cent to 100 per cent of the potentially evaded duties and the amounts are shared 
amongst the treasury (around 30 per cent), the officials who lead investigations (10 per 
cent without any capping) and their chiefs (4 per cent without any capping). Describing 
this legal distribution of fines leads us into a third type of circulating money that is 
neither public nor private. 
2.1  Collective money circulation separated from public money and bribes 
In addition to personal rewards as seen above, a share of the fines (around 40 per cent) 
is legally paid towards internal funds.4 These internal funds fuel a ‘mutuelle’ (a 
collective system which reimburses medical expenses) as well as grants to well-
deserving officers, purchase of equipment, renovation of buildings, and expenses related 
to international meetings. These internal funds constitute collective money; money that 
is collected by the group for the needs of the group. These internal funds are fuelled by 
different sources other than fines. The main one is fees, such as the information 
technology fee and the ‘protocol’ fees. The IT fee is automatically assessed and paid by 
private operators, for each declaration they register in the IT customs system. Protocol 
fees better illustrate the fact that collective money may be an imaginative and pragmatic 
way of fighting corruption.  
In 2000, Cameroon customs instituted protocols at the port of Douala, in line with 
private operators, to eradicate bribes. Protocols are agreements between the 
administration and the stakeholders in the customs processes such as shipping agents,5 
customs brokers,6 and consignees.7 Protocols formally establish the amount of fees 
which are applied for any task requiring interaction between the customer and the 
                                                 
3  Evaluating bribes is out of the scope of this paper. Evaluation is not so difficult since everyone talks 
more or less freely. Each officer feels free to talk about his corrupt colleagues. The free and abundant 
speech about corruption reflects that corruption induces competition between corrupt officers. Bribes 
depend on the fraudulent character or not of the cargo. If it is not a fraud case, bribes are not related to 
the value of the cargo but to the ‘facilitation’ offered by the corrupted officer. If it is a fraud case or if 
the private operator bribes an officer to perform a fraud, the amount of the fraud losses is assumed to 
be divided up following informal rules. 
4  Management of fines and internal funds is specified in the following legal texts  : Décret N° 
94/240/PM du 27 mai 1994  modified by the Décret N° 96/217/PM du 02 avril 1996; Arrêté   
N° 317/MINFI/DD du 4 juillet 1994; Arrêté N° 318/MINFI/DD du 4 juillet 1994. 
5  Before a vessel’s arrival, shipping agents record a summary description of all shipped goods, the 
‘cargo manifest’. 
6  Importers/exporters are not legally allowed to declare goods by themselves. They must contract a 
broker to do it for them. Brokers are authorized by the customs service to deal with customs-related 
operations. 
7  Consignees manage warehouses inside and outside the port. They are responsible for goods waiting to 
be released by customs officials. After the payment of taxes and duties, the broker requests the 
consignee to physically release the goods. The consignee records an exit note in the IT customs 
system.  
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official—asking for a modification of the cargo manifest, cancelling a declaration, 
delivering a transit form. This is called ‘extra-legal work’ inherited from the colonial 
French customs administration. An importer who wanted his goods to be released after 
working hours had to pay overtime for customs officials and the amount was paid back 
in an internal fund. The main difference between colonial times and the present is that 
overtime no longer matters. Protocols and extra-legal work are established for any task 
even during open hours in order to constitute extra-wages and eradicate bribes. On the 
one hand, private operators do not complain of this system because it is transparent and 
predictable. Moreover managers of brokerage companies do not trust their employees 
who are suspected of collusion with corrupt officials. They are, therefore, reassured by 
formal fixed fees. 
On the other hand, customs officials do not complain either. A first share of the extra-
legal work fund is allocated to all officials who work in the administrative area where 
protocol fees have been collected. The second share is dedicated to bonuses for all 
officials. Bonuses are a usual internal tool for recognition and payment when unusual 
and particularly efficient tasks are performed within working groups. Each monthly 
session of a working group may generate US$100 for each member; to be a member of 
a special task force may generate around US$1,000 (meanwhile the official monthly 
wage of US$550). The last share is an incentive to the ‘unlucky’ officials working at the 
headquarters, far from the field of action. Collecting and redistributing fees as collective 
money is perceived as legitimate since, on the ground, money is lacking both at 
individual8 and institutional levels (Bilangna 2009).9 
In comparison to public money and bribes, collective money is extracted in the same 
trade flows to ensure internal expenditure and extra-wage incomes, a transparent and 
non-competitive way. In this legal and complex remuneration system, there is, however, 
no limit for personal income. This money circulation induces two characteristics of the 
customs officials group—both the relative financial autonomy of their institution and 
their potential individual wealth—which raises them to the rank of a national elite. 
2.2  Customs officials as a national ruling elite 
At the institutional level, the system has a reverse effect. It collects fees for its own 
internal funds and the customs service is perceived as a wealthy public service and gets 
very limited funding from the national budget. Conversely, customs officers do not miss 
the opportunity to remind people of their administration’s contribution to the nation. In 
2006, a speech by a top-level officer reminded the audience of the historical existence 
of the customs administration in the port of Douala ‘when the Internal Revenue 
Administration did not even exist’. Moreover, from a concrete point of view, customs 
taxes and duties are actually collected by officials whereas the VAT which constitutes 
                                                 
8  In 1994, civil servant wages were cut by 75 per cent. Customs officers consider this measure as the 
very cause of the increasing corruption in public services. Unfortunately, it is not possible to 
quantitatively check this assertion. 
9  Even if this could be controversial, many customs officials consider that this collection of fees is 
compliant with the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) and its article VIII, the purpose 
of which is to impose that fees ‘shall be limited in amount to the approximate cost of services 
rendered and shall not represent an indirect protection to domestic products or a taxation of imports or 
exports for fiscal purposes’.  
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half of all internal revenue, is paid back monthly by private companies with minimal 
intervention from the Internal Revenue Administration.  
Consequently, the population accurately perceives the importance of the customs 
apparatus. In 2007, when the new customs IT system was rolled out in the port of 
Douala, customs brokers were unprepared. Import flows slowed for one week. On the 
second day, three major national newspapers ran their headlines with customs losing 
FCFA 1 billion (approximately US$2 million) a day in the port, which was untrue but 
created fear about the difficulties the government would endure in order to pay civil 
servants.10 This fiscal weight and its social impact are tied up with the idea of the 
‘developer state’ supported by national government and donors. 
Scarcity is, however, not always synonymous with discretion. Some weeks after the 
2007 local elections, a newspaper accused an officer, who was the mayor of a large 
town in the Southern Province, of being ‘le douanier glouton’ (the gluttonous customs 
officer). Newspapers devote numerous articles to customs officials including incomes of 
customs officials, market price list or taxation measures and cumbersome procedures. 
They also report gossip related to internal promotions and conflicts between officers and 
bureaus. Customs officers themselves are reputed to write articles, using pseudonyms, 
to portray high-level managers’ choices as bad or tainted by vested interests. 
Customs officials’ perceived wealth is not only a source of popular gossip. During a 
meeting to encourage officials to adopt good practices and improve their image, a senior 
customs officer invoked the feeling of suspicion that exists even within their own 
families. ‘We all know this, when a cousin comes to your home and asks you for a 
bottle of whisky. You give him a bottle and he is still disappointed, thinking about the 
case of bottles you are concealing from him’. The brand new area of Douala is named 
‘quartier des douaniers’ (customs area) or ‘Santa Barbara’. Suits, cars, and houses are 
signs of wealth and perceived by people as evidence of corruption, even if legal income 
from fines or protocols could also explain the individual wealth. 
Ordinary citizens are very knowledgeable about customs matters, the customs’ way of 
life and the institution itself. Even in rural areas, people are connected to customs 
officials. In the bulletin of a customs officers’ association, one member delineates elites 
as urban elites organizing their rural communities: ‘On the ground, it is a reality that 
urban elites are those who head the best organized rural groups’ (Sighomnwe 1997). 
This phenomenon of urban elites committed to the development of their villages has 
been extensively analysed (Nyamjoh and Rowlands 1998; Monga 2000; Mouiche 2005) 
and customs officials are fully involved in this process. 
Locally, this ability to organize is linked to politics. As are other civil servants, many 
customs officers are interested in politics and a large majority supports the CPDM 
(Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement), the party of the President who came to 
power in 1982. Many officers hold various positions such as mayor, chief of a local 
section of the party, electoral judge and, for all the senior managers, ‘personnel 
resource’, people who support the actions of the CPDM financially and personally. The 
                                                 
10 Indeed, even if structural adjustments promote liberal policies, most of the public aid devolves on 
administrations (Hugon 1999) and the state remains the first employer of young graduates (Sindzingre 
1994).  
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CPDM is often considered as the only means of gaining access to local responsibilities 
and thus the only way of bringing financial resources to villages and monitoring the 
conduct of public affairs. The CPDM, as a structured political party, complies perfectly 
with the idea of elites organizing the population.  
But the village is not a sanctuary. Customs officers are included within this elite—such 
as merchants depicted by Geschiere (1996)—characterized by sudden wealth whose 
origins are unknown and put down to magic, especially ‘famla’ which is a common 
witchcraft belief according to which an individual can become a sorcerer, earn social 
advantages and money by selling or eating (killing) their relatives. For example, it 
happened that an officer did not bury two relatives in his village, which is very 
uncommon. As a consequence, a rumour quickly spread among his customs colleagues 
who said that he might have been stopped by villagers who suspected him of being a 
sorcerer who had killed his relatives in order to be promoted. 
Wealth and sorcery, scarcity, commitment in politics and in development both at 
national and local levels, the financial autonomy in the daily functioning of the customs 
apparatus, such are the characteristics of the representation of customs officials as a 
national elite. This representation is fuelled by money and its material circulation within 
and outside the group. Thanks to their legal system of extra-wages and, for some of 
them, thanks to (or because of) the bribes they receive, customs officials are wealthy, 
wooed at an individual level by relatives, but comprehensively scorned by the whole 
society.  
However, before examining the ability of this national elite to manage change, the 
money circulation system still raises empirical questions. Who regulates the internal 
flow of collective money? How does this way of regulating condition the nature of the 
authority and the ability to reform?  
2.3  The existence of an intra-elite embedded in a system of checks and balances 
More than raising customs civil servants to the rank of national elite, the money 
circulation supports a second feature of the social group of customs officials—it makes 
possible, and somehow necessary, the existence of an intra-elite.  
Indeed, one major characteristic of the money circulation is that the redistributed money 
mostly circulates in the form of ready cash. The central cashier who manages all the 
customs internal funds is nicknamed ‘World Bank’ by his colleagues. His duty would 
become impossible if each beneficiary in each committee, working group or task force 
came to his office to claim their share. Thus, cash flows down through the hierarchical 
chain to the beneficiaries. ‘Chiefs’ of divisions, of services, of bureaus, of groups, and 
of committees, redistribute the collective money in the form of cash that has been 
distributed to them by their superiors. 
The Cameroonian people have a word for persons that handle money they do not collect 
by themselves: the Katikas (‘cash-taker’, ‘cash take care’). This pidgin word is widely 
used to name the big boss in a casino (Fouda 2001; Echu 2003), a croupier, a treasurer, 
a regional paymaster, and by extension, all chiefs managing money. Thus, the group of 
customs officials is strongly divided between bosses who have something to redistribute 
and those who do not have such power. ‘Customs Katikas’ are an intra-elite thanks to 
their power to distribute wealth within the group.  
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Customs chiefs are also considered as an intra-elite in terms of wealth. Indeed, as 
described above, the money circulation establishes that senior management legally earns 
a share of all internal funds their subordinates collect. The first consequence is a strong 
inequity of income and privilege. In Europe, the difference between the highest and 
lowest income of customs officials does not exceed 1 to 10. In Cameroon customs, this 
difference is roughly at 1 to 50, and perhaps 1 to 100 in the case of efficient customs 
investigators, and even greater for corrupt officers. 
Therefore, heading a bureau or an operational unit is a crucial and pivotal moment in an 
official’s life and there is competition between customs bureaus. A bureau is nicknamed 
‘El Barça’, another ‘Milan AC’ (the best European football teams), another ‘Terre 
Promise’ (The Promised Land), meanwhile the central service is ‘Guingamp’ which was 
the last football team in the French national championship.  
Those playing at ‘Milan AC’ struggle to remain. For this purpose, they need to achieve 
the annual revenue targets set by the government. In the port of Douala, revenue 
collection is monitored on a daily basis and strict observance of the legal framework is 
not the main issue for officers. Customs officers are not discouraged from applying 
‘specific rules’ as long as the expected level of revenue is ensured (Cantens 2009). For 
instance, some chiefs of bureau conclude ‘partnerships’ with importers; they negotiate 
the ‘acceptable level of taxation’ that is compliant with the revenue targets, and, as a 
counterpart, merchants commit to pay the agreed duties on time.  
These partnerships may have negative consequences on revenue collection. In one of 
the customs regions, all chiefs of bureau are competing by practicing ‘dumping’, which 
consists of lowering the ‘acceptable level of taxation’ continuously to attract users. 
During an internal meeting, the head of the region complained about what he named 
‘the policy of the best offer’. The competition among his chiefs of bureau was bringing 
down the global revenue of his region and, consequently, threatening his own position. 
These partnerships illustrate the fragility of chiefs’ authority despite their statutory 
hierarchical power. On the one hand, the means to fight fraud are lacking. Chiefs of 
operational units are aware of their limited means to contest the declared value of the 
goods by importers and it is easy for brokers to ask exporters to send fake invoices.11 
On the other hand, corruption among their subordinates could be a major impediment to 
achieve the revenue targets. These chiefs are less physically involved in the collection 
than their grassroots officials; the latter are always tied up with the dilemma of 
collecting money for the treasury, or for the group, or for themselves personally.  
There is a strong asymmetry of information between chiefs and subordinates and chiefs 
(Katikas) are themselves subordinates to their grassroots officials who concretely 
extract money. Chiefs must, therefore, constantly find an equilibrium between (i) 
revenue collection in accordance with government targets whose achievement allows 
                                                 
11 Since 1994, Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade stipulates that the value for 
customs service purposes of imported goods is, by default, the value which is declared by the importer 
as it is supposed to be the actual transaction value. The article also stipulates the ways the Customs 
Service is allowed to contest the declared value. This agreement on customs valuation has reversed the 
relationship between customs officials and importers. Before the agreement, a ‘normal market price’ 
was set for each product. Thus, customs officials had an easy legal way to contest the declared value.   
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them to remain in their position, (ii) reallocation of internal funds within their unit by 
redistributing collective money at the individual level and dedicating money to the 
necessary material equipment, and (iii) an acceptable level of corruption within their 
units since corruption distracts both collective money and public money.  
2.4  A non-coercive authority legitimated by elitism 
The main consequence of this dependence is that chiefs’ authority is non-coercive and 
fully based on redistribution. Authority is a key point when reforming a service; the 
weakness of the hierarchical chain is a much-discussed issue which has often been 
designated as the main cause of the failure of reforms and modernization efforts 
(Mbembe 1999; Olowu 1999; Raffinot 2001; Chambas 2005; World Bank 2005). 
However, thanks to collective money circulation, hierarchical authority is not so weak. 
The non-coercive authority is deeply rooted in the professional culture of customs 
officials and is the main feature of the social relationships within the group. On the one 
hand, officers cannot impose administrative sanctions. The formal order of the 
organizational chart is competing with a specific social order which derives from   
the appointment process, within which the head has little influence on the appointment 
of their direct subordinate, but has much more influence on the appointment of the 
subordinate of their subordinate (Cantens 2009). This ‘N-2 order’ prevents the risk of 
collusion between officers but is also sometimes an impediment to severe sanctions. On 
the field, chiefs rarely write reports against their subordinates. When they are asked why 
—since without any report it is impossible for them to initiate a disciplinary action—
they reply that they did not know the connections between their subordinates and any 
upper elite, outside or inside the administration, who could stop the sanctioning process. 
Of course, this could be a self-legitimizing discourse and some of these chiefs are also 
afraid that their corrupt subordinates will reveal their chiefs’ misconducts if accused. 
But this situation illustrates the strength of this ‘N-2’ social order competing with the 
hierarchical order. 
On the other hand, several observable rituals of authority bear witness of the existence 
of this non-coercive authority. The profusion of rituals becomes part of daily life. All 
the meetings held in the customs service or between the customs service and the public 
are very ritualized. The invitation includes a subtle combination of titles and names; the 
presence or absence of an agenda has meaning, and so does the way you have been 
invited; the seating in the meeting room opposes field services and central ones, 
anonymous officials and stars; people wait for the principal actor—the head who chairs 
the meeting—who talks about every subject except the one that was supposed to be 
discussed at the meeting (Cantens 2009).  
Another example of rituals is the usual harangue by the chief during meetings. 
Haranguing is an evidence of the chief’s status. The chief speaks the truth, which leads 
to repetition of obvious facts. Slogans include praised values on how to be a ‘good’ 
customs officer. Besides, the chief’s speech is hegemonic and takes up most of the time. 
This monopoly on the speech differentiates power and coercion (Clastres 1962). 
A third kind of ritual supporting the non-coercive authority of the chiefs is directly 
linked to money redistribution. As we noted above, transparency is a main feature of 
money collection—transparency of the ‘protocols’ dampens the competition induced by 
potential corruption. But transparency is also an essential element in the ritual of  
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redistribution itself. Officials are presented with cash and a sheet of paper they have to 
sign to attest they have received their share. This sheet of paper sets out the amount of 
money paid to each official, so that everyone is explicitly informed of how much their 
colleagues, even the chiefs, have received.  
Concrete rituals legitimate the position of the chiefs (Bourdieu 1982; Abélès 1990). 
Rituals combine with transparency in order to demonstrate that the chiefs’ ability to 
redistribute money is not underpinned by greed. Rituals balance the strong dependence 
of the chiefs on their grassroots supporters who constantly invest the chiefs with their 
statutory authority, which compensates for the non-coercive component of this 
authority. Rituals, however, question us also about their role in reinforcing officials’ 
consent to an ideology that legitimates the existence of the intra elite. 
Perhaps one of the most striking facts about these bureaucratic elites is that they 
explicitly claim to be part of the elite, which differentiates them from the Western elites 
(Bourdieu 1989; Hill 1995; Persell and Cookson 2001). There are at least three 
professional associations: one for natives of the West region, one for the ‘rest of the 
world’ (in fact the Centre and South regions) and one for women. All associations claim 
to have ‘educational’ purposes. One association publishes a 10–20 pages monthly 
bulletin about collective activities such as funerals, weddings and deaths but also issues 
opinion articles and technical communications, all authored by customs officers. The 
third issue of the bulletin deals with ‘elitism and professionalism’: ‘Elitism because the 
circle is a circle of elites’ (Cheping 1997). Elitism is held as ‘a pillar to establish a 
philosophical ground’ (Cheping 1998a). Excellence supports elitism as an inherent 
quality in those who are involved in their job. As the editorialist of the fifth edition 
(Cheping 1998b) says: ‘It is not doubtful and even obvious that our profession is the 
basement of our “Cercle d’Élites”’. 
It is worth remembering that elitism is historically rooted in the colonial period. 
Historically, the customs state apparatus played a key role in the national policy. During 
German domination, from 1884 to 1916, customs duties were the third source of 
revenue after grants and loans from the German Imperial Government (Tsuyano 2006). 
This was still true during the mandate given to the French in 1921 by the League of 
Nations. This mandate imposed free trade but uncertainty about the destiny   
of Cameroon discouraged grants and international loans (Guyer 1980). Tribal chiefs 
were recruited by the German and the French colonial administrations in order to collect 
tax and, usually, civil servants were promoted as local elite. As a result, in West Africa, 
from 1946 to 1952, 50 per cent of the representatives in the national assemblies were 
civil servants (Le Vine 1968).  
After independence, the former customs officials of the French administration became 
the first-generation of top level officers. These officials had already experienced the 
elitist way to high level positions. Indeed, the ‘cadre indigene’ (native officials) were 
promoted within the top level officers ‘cadre A’ by the governor himself who was the 
highest authority of the French administration. It took twenty years for the first native to 
become an officer.  
Education is now at the centre of elitism, and elitism is an ideological crucible for this 
new bureaucracy. The importance of education is linked to the National School of 
Administration and Magistrate (ENAM) which is acknowledged as the best secondary 
education institution of the country. This also explains why customs officers are seen as  
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an aristocracy, a ‘state nobility’ (Bourdieu 1989) rooted in their recruitment, because it 
is financially attractive and it is a privilege to be part of it. Therefore, the best students 
who have successfully passed the competitive examination usually choose customs 
administration as their first choice. 
Thus, the ‘inside’ description of the functioning of the customs service leads to some 
conclusions that will be useful to understand how this customs elite tackles the reform 
of their administration. 
First, as in any other fiscal administration, Cameroon customs is a state apparatus 
extracting money. As previously discussed, however, some extracted money is 
qualitatively different from taxes and bribes. Customs officials legally extract 
‘collective money’. This collective money ensures wealth both at the institutional and 
the individual levels and makes the customs officials a national ruling elite. Second, the 
redistribution of collective money grounds the non-coercive authority customs chiefs 
exert in a context of corruption and lack of means. It is, therefore, untrue to say that the 
hierarchical chain is weak. The way of exerting authority is different from the ‘ideal-
type’ of the fully obedient (Crozier 1955) civil servant (Weber and Parsons 1947). The 
operational chiefs are committed to monitor a subtle balance between collective and 
public money collection and the impact of corruption. Third, this non-coercive authority 
is supported by an ideology of elitism that is produced by the customs.12 Elitism secures 
the consent to authority and to the rules of the internal money circulation, despite the 
fact that these rules generate an important inequity of incomes between the chiefs and 
their subordinates.  
Here, the question of administrative reform intersects with the question of the 
conditions of reproduction of the group, which is one of the most important issues 
concerning elites (Shore 2002). To what extent is elitism and money circulation, 
fuelling each other and conditioning the reproduction of the group, a chance or a trap for 
those who want to reform their administration?  
3  Consequences and perspectives for an administrative reform 
The question of whether elitism may be an impediment to change is part of the broader 
back-and-forth debate about African elites’ responsibility and role in development 
(Blanchet 1969; Miller 1974; Schraeder 1994). The ideas of ‘civic engagement’, ‘social 
accountability’, ‘engaged societies’ supported by donors (Ackerman 2005; World Bank 
2005) renewed the historical defiance against bureaucratic and political elites. 
Questioning the question is not within the scope of this paper. One can assume that this 
question may be —in our context—the best one about elites, on the condition that we do 
not expect too much from the response.  
Certainly, analysing the current functioning of the customs service in terms of 
consequences could also be a trap for anthropologists. Tackling issues connected to 
reform inevitably leads to a solutions-oriented approach, which raises a new key 
methodological issue, namely: how to avoid wading into the infertile debate between 
the teleological approaches of development and their radical critics? The empirical 
                                                 
12 About the ideological production of repressive state apparatus, see Althusser (1995).  
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approach, adopted in the former section, has been useful to understand the actual 
functioning of the service, but extrapolating from these short-term observations 
collected within the micro society of customs officers requires a major precaution—to 
discard oneself of ‘good governance’ as governance exists in itself and to favour 
‘situations of governance’ (Blundo 2002). In this particular case, this means taking into 
account that all customs officers are very knowledgeable about good professional 
practices so that reform only relies on wilful officers and the appointment process 
becomes a crucial situation of governance. 
Indeed, Cameroon customs officers are very well trained at the ENAM, they attend 
many international meetings, especially at the World Customs Organization that 
produces norms related to customs procedures. In addition, Cameroon customs is 
collaborating with five major international organizations and donors on modernization 
initiatives. This means there is at least one or two meetings per month between senior 
officers and international experts sent by donors. Thus, customs officers have no 
difficulty imagining what a modern customs service must be and do.  
In 2006–10, the reform I participated in was a real struggle between officers who are 
motivated to deliver better customs functions and those who are not. In 2005, the 
Cameroon government undertook the implementation of a new IT system at the port of 
Douala by 1 January 2007, following an IMF recommendation. To do so, Cameroon 
customs created an internal working group whose members were senior officers. 
Despite the fact that all those officers actually agreed on making the government’s 
pledge a reality, they did not share a common view on outcomes and impacts on the 
customs service. For some of them, this new IT system, which was provided by an 
international organization, had to be adapted in order to fit exactly with the existing 
procedures and the procedures themselves to be changed only slightly. They argued the 
‘local context’ must surpass the ‘international standards—the international standards 
would rock the local way of collecting revenue and threatened the achievement of the 
annual revenue targets. Others, the reformers, supported the idea that a new IT system 
provided by an international organization was an opportunity to reform the procedures 
drastically, and for the Cameroon customs to achieve international standards. 
Ultimately, some ‘reformers’ were appointed to manage the project and they succeeded 
in reforming customs procedures after numerous clashes (Cantens 2007). At the end of 
their successful project many of these reformers were promoted, which was a chance to 
enter the intra elite of customs. 
Thus, appointing officials to and keeping them in key positions, such are the high-stakes 
‘situations of governance’ before and during a reform, is worth exploring. 
3.1  To be appointed and to appoint—the major challenges for reformers 
A well-known bon mot repeats what a former minister of finance said: it is easier to 
remove a minister from the government than a customs officer from Douala, the 
Cameroon capital city for trade and business. One of the worst administrative sanctions 
is to be moved out of a major bureau operating in areas with strong fiscal potential; 
meanwhile to be appointed in these bureaus is one of the best incentives. To be 
appointed and to have people appointed are the major challenges of customs elites. 
Appointments are driven by three main parameters connected to the fight against 
corruption.  
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The first parameter is that the appointment of the head of the customs service is 
essentially restricted to the corps. A non-customs civil servant has headed the customs 
administration only once. The appointed person was a senior manager of the Internal 
revenue administration, but his mandate was terminated less than one year after his 
appointment. The head of customs should be one of the top level customs officers since 
fighting against corruption requires a very good knowledge of the field. Consequently, 
the president chooses the head of customs from among the 150 top level senior officers. 
The second parameter is that belonging to the corps should not be synonymous with 
internal tribal, regional, or political networking. In the case of the head of customs, 
appointing someone from outside is often the best solution. Any head of customs in the 
last twenty years has spent time outside customs during their career, either as a member 
of parliament, director of the former national bank of development, teacher, customs 
instructor abroad, officer in the internal revenue administration, member of the 
ministry’s cabinet, director in other ministries, accountant, or director in state-owned 
enterprises. So far, there has been no head of customs who has entered the ENAM just 
after university graduation and served exclusively in the customs administration.  
The third parameter is regional equilibrium, which impacts all kinds of positions at the 
national level. Regional equilibrium means that senior civil servants are appointed so 
that no region or tribe is favoured in administrating the state. Since independence, the 
regime’s attention has been focused on the unity of the state-driven by the idea of a fair, 
ethnic and regional representation at the top levels of the state (Eyoh 2004). For 
instance, all regions must be represented at the head of major bureaus. Regional 
equilibrium is presented as the main impediment to tribalism even if it ties up 
bureaucratic elites to their village, which historically impacted political life and 
bureaucratic performance (Doho 2006; Monga 2000). Regional equilibrium was 
translated concretely in the ENAM examination according to the level of schooling in 
the regions. Historically, protestant and catholic missions trained people for colonial 
companies established in the South and the Centre, so other regions had a lower literacy 
rate. Accordingly, there were two examinations; one for the regions that had a high 
literacy rate and another one for the ones with a low literacy rate. This distinction was 
abrogated in 1987. Nevertheless, a legal quota system still exists. It defines the share of 
successful candidates for each region. The origin of each candidate is the province of 
origin of their parents.13 
These three parameters combine with a high turnover. Since independence 38 years ago, 
there have been 16 heads of customs, while in the internal revenue administration there 
have been less than ten. Between 2006 and 2010, the Douala sector was headed by a 
succession of three officers, and was the major port office. 
The high mobility of officials is also tied to strong donor recommendations, as a way to 
fight corruption linked to sensible positions (De Wulf and Sokol 2004). Combined with 
the three parameters (to belong to the corps, to avoid non-professional networking, and 
to comply with the regional equilibrium policy), this turnover also has a perverse effect 
on legitimacy. Local, political, and external constraints make appointments 
unpredictable for most officials. The appointments process is not mainly driven by pure 
administrative parameters such as age, rank, and the assumption that career 
                                                 
13 Décret n°2000/696 PM du 13 septembre 2000—article 60.  
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advancement should be linear. Even the reformers are submitted to the same structural 
constraints—after the end of the successful project described above, reformers waited 
for two years to be awarded with good positions. 
Moreover, three factors increase the intensity of the uncertainty. The first one is linked 
to the collective money circulation. As seen above, appointments have a huge impact on 
an individual’s material condition. The second factor is linked to the first constraint; the 
position of head of customs is a probable horizon for all officers, so that all colleagues 
of the same age group are potentially competing for the top-level position. The last 
factor is the fact that there is no set date for appointments, only signals announcing an 
administrative turmoil; officers are in the habit of saying ‘the appointments war has 
begun’ and candidates for high positions are nicknamed ‘the papabile’, to figure out 
how it would be rash to predict the outcome of any appointments process.  
Thus, the appointment process structurally pushes the administrative boundaries by 
including constraints considered to be a solution to prevent revenue losses induced  
by corruption. This situation of governance has two features that impact on the 
reformers’ legitimacy—it infers violence and pushes the personal abilities into the 
background.  
3.2  The violence of the appointments process and its impact on legitimacy 
The first feature is that, on the ground, this appointment process and its uncertainty 
stoke some kind of violence, which opens up fissures in the officers’ legitimacy. Indeed, 
once it becomes clear that the current head of customs or the current head of a major 
bureau will leave or retire, the press begins reporting gossip about each candidate. 
Taking into account the fact that chiefs exert a non-coercive authority and that rituals of 
authority are very important, the impact of gossip must not be underestimated. When 
making headlines, feuds widen mistrust. Photos of an officer’s expensive house, 
facsimiles of a list of customs data as ‘evidence’ of bad practices, sexual rumours, lists 
of civil servants who will be or are millionaires and homosexuals—all of these have 
occurred recently.14 Suspicion and mistrust are all the more heightened because 
officials are convinced that many details—minutes of the meetings, internal documents 
—are leaked to the press by their own colleagues competing for the position. 
To reinforce legitimacy, mistrust is sometimes tackled officially. For example, when the 
press ‘denounces’ the collusion between one importer and some customs chiefs,   
the latter do not always wait for a complaint to be lodged—the customs service issues a 
press release that explains the legal context, provides some figures and demonstrates 
                                                 
14 Some examples. Between 24 and 26 January 2006, three newspapers (La Météo, L’Anecdote and La 
Nouvelle Afrique) issued lists of civil servants and ministers who were accused to be homosexuals. On 
the 9 and 26 February 2006, Le Front issued a list of civil servants who were accused to be 
millionaires. One month later the same newspaper issued a list of civil servants who were supposed to 
be charged with corruption. On 14 April 2006, L’Ouest Républicain ‘denounced’ a mafia clan within 
which there was a customs officer, head of a central service. On 31 July 2007, Le Jeune Observateur 
issued a list of 44 billionaires among whom there was a former head of customs. On 18 April 2008, 
the newspaper Aurore Plus accused a senior officer who was newly appointed of having been corrupt 
in the recent past. In 1999 (22 March), Le Front Indépendant issued an article discussing the 
nominations in the customs administration taking individual examples.  
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that the importer was not given any preferential treatment. This illustrates that senior 
officers are concerned about being misrepresented.  
After such rumour campaigns, legitimacy of the senior officers competing for high 
positions may be weakened. In order to reinforce it, the moment of the appointment 
could be a ‘coup de force’. Customs officials use to tell a true story about a former head 
of customs’ replacement. The evening news broadcast informed this head of customs 
that he was relieved of his duties, just before policemen burst into his office, ordering 
him to get out without taking any documents. Policemen blocked the building of 
customs and, after a couple of hours, the former head of customs exited his office with 
two policemen. He was not accused of anything. This violent exit was interpreted as a 
show of force organized by the newly nominated head of customs. Transfer rituals are 
often unfriendly; the person leaving becomes a social pariah. The new chief derives 
their legitimacy from his appointment by the minister or the president as well as from 
force and violence. 
Violence and bureaucratic elites’ struggles are not specific to Cameroon. Marenin 
(2005) described this phenomenon about the control of the police administration in 
Nigeria. This strange situation with regards to competition among bureaucratic elites, 
however, should not conceal a very concrete impact that links reform and legitimacy. 
As senior management is in a hurry to collect more revenue and has little influence on 
appointments, it is tempting to create parallel structures and positions, such as task 
forces, committees, special advisors, or coordinators of activities, in charge of the 
reform. At the beginning of a mandate, a newly appointed senior officer failed to gather 
skilled officers in order to set up a small team in charge of a reform he wanted   
to implement. One officer who supported him contacted young skilled officers to 
encourage them to leave their operational positions on the field and to commit 
themselves to reform. But they refused, arguing that the head of service was not ready 
to pay substantial bonuses to recruit them to pay for the risks they would take. Indeed, 
these ‘special’ positions, given to wilful reformers, are far from the field and usually 
belittled, since officials can neither be bribed nor earn legal shares on fines. Moreover, 
the legitimacy of the newly appointed head of service may have been weakened by the 
whispering campaign organized against him by unsuccessful colleagues. Therefore, 
these parallel structures need to be attractive and task force members have to be 
awarded and encouraged with bonuses. But these bonuses are extracted from the 
collective money circulating which now can no longer be collectively divided within the 
group; this meets with opposition from the other officials who were not selected to be 
members of the special team. Consequently, other senior officers always challenge the 
newly appointed officials’ authority since, as members of a special team, they are not 
appointed by a national legal act but an internal one.  
Due to constraints that do not include only administrative criteria such as age and rank, 
the appointment process brings about intense competition within the intra-elite. Even if 
reformers are appointed, they have paid the price; rumours and gossip have weakened 
their legitimacy. In spite of any show of force, they will find it difficult to recruit wilful 
subordinates, since they do not master the appointment process so that they are obliged 
to create internal and temporary structures that need to be fuelled with money extracted 
from the collective money circulating.  
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The ability to reform is not only impacted by violence. Collective representations 
connected to regional belonging are the second feature of the appointments process that 
also impacts the legitimacy of the newly appointed reformers.  
3.3  The weight of collective representation against the individual capacity 
We saw that regional equilibrium was an important explicit constraint driving the 
appointments process. Consequently, regional equilibrium is often invoked to explain 
why somebody has been appointed, which depreciates the capacity of the new appointed 
officer by emphasizing his regional belonging as the main factor that drove his 
appointment, and pushing his technical skills into the background.  
Nevertheless, it is difficult to actually interpret the appointments in terms of regional 
equilibrium. At the highest level, this distribution of the regional equilibrium is not so 
accurate and officials know this. Amongst the 16 former head of customs, one came 
from the North of the country, one from the Eastern part, one from the North-West 
(English-speaking), none was from the West. Appointments of the chiefs of regions do 
not fit the same model. There is no obstacle to appoint a chief in the region from which 
he originates. For instance, the main sector of Douala collects more than 85 per cent of 
the country’s customs revenue and a large majority of merchants are natives of the 
West. During the past seven years, the sector was headed by natives of the Centre, 
the South and the West (at least twice).  
From observations in the field, the internal ties between officers do not overlap with the 
regional ‘natural’ ties. Of course, officers are always talking about themselves using 
ethnic definitions and one can agree that modernity did not end ethnicity (Amselle and 
M’bokolo 1985; Bates 1999). But, as Bates differentiates ethnicity and violence, 
ethnicity and tribalism must also be differentiated. Ethnicity is a necessary condition for 
the exercise of regional equilibrium, so ethnicity is valued more and more (Monga 
2000; Geschiere 2009). However, elitism is still a common feature of the top-level civil 
servants as a way of transcending tribalism. This is why, for instance, colleagues do not 
condemn the existing West officers’ association. This association is only perceived as a 
characteristic of natives from the West whose traditions include more organization and 
hierarchy, which has been depicted by Miaffo and Warnier (1993) as an ‘ethos of 
notability’.  
Elitism and regional equilibrium in customs build an anti-tribal ideology. First, tribal or 
regional belonging always raise a suspicion of archaism; customs officers definitely 
consider tribalism as archaic. Second, as a concrete effect, tribalism does not comply 
with the pressure of the regional equilibrium as a threat. Officials could group 
themselves to claim more positions for their region. They also could use the restricted 
group to cool down conflicts even if they do not always succeed.  
Thus, officers are not fully convinced that everything is settled ‘in the village’. But, the 
power of regional equilibrium lies in the fact that they are not convinced that   
the opposite is true either. Regional equilibrium is a total cause and part of the 
‘collective imaginary’ (Lévi-Strauss 1958). When a person who is turned out is replaced 
by a native of the same region, people invoke regional equilibrium. If this is not the 
case, regional equilibrium becomes dynamic; people usually say that positions turn over 
from one region to another. Even when a replacement has no explanation, regional 
equilibrium is still meaningful as a circulation of power. Indeed, a chief who was  
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replaced by a native of a different region explained that he was a ‘collateral victim’; 
within another administration, a native of his successor’s region was replaced by a 
native of his own region. Of course, it is not possible to confirm this, but the fact that 
regional equilibrium provides a full intellectual framework for officials when analysing 
the motivation of appointments reinforces the elitism—as a representation of a national 
elite fairly sharing and efficiently exerting the bureaucratic power—as well as it 
depreciates individual abilities.  
Legitimacy is a common question when focusing on elites (Shore 2002), but it is a 
decisive one when examining the capacity to reform. Legitimacy issues arise from the 
appointment process and conditions the access to the authority by reformers. At present, 
reformers and non-reformers are tied up in the same struggle to be appointed as well as 
using the same collective money to expand their power within the administration. On 
the one hand, their legitimacy is weakened since being appointed means having been the 
target of rumours. On the other hand, regional equilibrium as a total reason for 
appointments weakens the individual abilities of all newly appointed officers. Thus, the 
main issue, from a technical point of view, is how to reinforce the reformers’ legitimacy 
and build a new professional culture that would not only derive from the current 
ideology of elitism. 
3.4  Can figures reinforce reformers’ legitimacy? 
In 2008, the head of customs reformed ‘the way of reforming’, by launching an internal 
individual performance measurement policy (Libom et al. 2009). On a monthly basis, 
quantitative indicators report what actually happens on the ground, both at collective 
(bureaus, sectors) and individual levels. Indicators have been designed to generate 
figures about identified bad practices and potential risks of collusion between officers. 
Thanks to reports and debriefing, the customs senior management share detailed facts 
and figures on delays, losses of revenue, profitability of the control and bad practices. 
Some figures about individual performances are compiled within a quarterly bulletin 
that publishes who was the best controller in terms of delays and fraud detection. 
It took about two years for the senior officers on the ground to take some kind of 
ownership of the figures. During the meetings, a new professional culture is becoming 
established; violence during the meetings has diminished; officials use less insinuations 
and accusations as they are invited to comment on the figures everybody is sharing. 
Thanks to the figures, the reality is the same for all. It has become easier for the senior 
managers to analyse the evolution of the revenue generated and compare it with the 
economic activity. It is also possible to discern the evolution of one bureau when the 
head is replaced. For example, it has been measured that a new chief succeeded in 
increasing the fines collected on fraud cases by 60 per cent while the number of fraud 
cases itself has only increased by 10 per cent. That means he has collected considerably 
more money than his predecessors. The same bureau succeeded in increasing the 
average level of taxes collected on one declaration by 10 per cent within a few months. 
This means that ‘the acceptable level of taxation’ increased without causing more 
delays. The result is that the head of this bureau has been in the position for two years, 
which is the longest period of stability since 2006. Combined with an increased 
transparency and the dissemination of poor results, some customs officials gave up bad 
practices.   
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Being able to describe the activity of one bureau means being able to measure the 
impact of the new procedures, the way the chief is implementing them and managing 
his subordinates, and the way the latter takes ownership of decisions.  
As a first positive consequence, officials are aware that senior management can 
distinguish those among them who work well and those who might be corrupt. This is 
the first fissure in elitism; even if officers all graduated from the best national school 
and are considered as members of the national elite, they are not equals internally in 
terms of work, and this can be objectively demonstrated.  
An internal performance measurement policy is an argument a head of service can use 
when he is pressured by outside elites to give a good position to one of their favourites. 
Individual performance measures and the threat that poor results could be objectively 
measured, compared and publicly released, may protect senior managers from the 
misuse of the non-administrative constraints of the appointment process. In working 
environments where detecting, proving, and punishing bad practices is difficult, senior 
officers prevent problems by avoiding bad officials being appointed as subordinates in 
their units. 
Individual performance measurement could be a solution to break through elitism, at 
least internally, by linking the identity of each officer to official data on custom 
outcomes. Figures have two advantages; they are assessed following the same methods 
for all officers, which allow benchmarking. The second advantage is the diachronic 
perspective embedded in performance measurement. Individual performance 
measurement cannot be a reform in itself but only a way to support the technical reform.  
4 Concluding  remarks 
Based of four years fieldwork and an individual commitment in supporting a reform, 
this paper raises some concluding remarks. 
First, one major recommendation would be for donors to commit themselves in 
understanding the current functioning of the civil services they support, throwing out 
any teleological approach as a first step. This was the best lesson learned from the 
technical support we provided to the Cameroon customs; this experiment could not have 
been done without establishing a strong confidence between donors and the customs 
service. This confidence has been concretely active as soon as the actual functioning of 
the customs service was accurately and objectively understood. This opened up the 
discussion for imagining another professional culture.  
Second, ‘ownership’ is presented as the core of any reform (Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness 2005; Raffinot 2009) and relies on one main question in the case of a 
customs reform: how do civil servants and private operators accept and apply new 
measures that would stir up what they do? This question is much more acute in the 
context of corruption. The global equilibrium between public money, bribes and 
collective money is questioned by the reform; the upheaval of better practices impacts 
the daily life and the personal incomes of the officials. So, the main question connected 
to ownership and reform is less how people are persuaded by the reform than why and 
how do people consent to the current system, especially when this system is unequal?  
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The main question of a reform is less ownership, which is difficult to predict, than 
consent, which is much more accessible to empirical analyses. 
Third, part of the response has its roots in understanding the role of ideology. To be an 
elite is proudly claimed. Elitism legitimizes chiefs in ruling the others, succeeding in 
improving them, and not necessarily complying with an ideal Weberian administrative 
structure. Elitism applied to customs officers does not contribute to eradicating the 
representation of a jeopardized state and, on a technical side, does not favour the idea of 
a national reform. Elitism ensures the homogeneity of civil servants against tribalism 
while supporting ethnicity that is required to apply regional equilibrium. 
Fourth, one major consequence of elitism concerns the imagination of the state 
(Ferguson and Gupta 2002), and its ability to be reformed, in terms of space and time.  
In terms of space, the state is perceived as a network of bureaus shaped by various well-
known interests. This perception of the state is only ordered by the fiscal potential of the 
customs bureaus. The border side effect of this representation is the inability of many 
officers to consider the reform of their administration for the benefit of the entire state. 
Globally, each bureau is a territory dominated by its elites dealing with a prior issue of 
‘peace’ and ‘stability’. 
In terms of time, the consequence of elitism is a rather structural duration based on an 
equilibrium (Gluckman 1968), ended by struggles for appointments. Appointments in 
customs are similar to the situation described by Gluckman (1963); the position of chief 
circulates quickly within the group, which generates continuous feuds and impacts the 
capacity for reforming. The continuous competition among the officers shapes the 
dynamics of the system of the Katikas whose function of money circulation ensures a 
‘peace in the feud’ (Gluckman 1955). In the case of customs, the structural duration is 
clearly the mandate of the head of customs. This structural duration arouses the interest 
of the donors, especially those who manage long-term projects. The main difficulties are 
not settled in technical issues since donors and customs usually agree about what to do. 
Above all, the management of the project questions the continuous commitment of the 
senior officers. The span of a project and the span of top-level officers are not the same, 
so development and reform are short-term issues. 
Thus, the question of technically supporting a customs reform is that of whether the 
constraint of development and the desire of quick and quantifiable results for donors 
surpasses or not the support for the political construction of a fiscal national apparatus.  
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